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ABSTRACT
Grounded in the 2018 California Camp Fire context, this study explores how message
framing in charitable appeals influences individuals’ donation intentions. A 2 (firstperson imagery perspective vs. third-person imagery perspective) × 2 (gain frame vs.
loss frame) between-subject online experiment was conducted via Amazon’s MTurk
(n = 475). Results showed that gain/loss framing and imagery perspectives interactively influenced participants’ donation intentions. Specifically, when a message is lossframed, a first-person imagery perspective (“I lose”) message is more effective than
a third-person imagery perspective (“they lose”) message in enhancing participants’
perceived issue relevance, induced empathy, and donation intention. In addition,
when the message is framed with a third-person imagery perspective, a gain-framed
(“they gain”) message is more persuasive than a loss-framed (“they lose”) message.
KEYWORDS: gain vs. loss framing, first vs. third-person imagery perspective, donation, disaster recovery, prosocial behavior

Wildfire disasters have become emerging global issues, occurring in Africa, Southeast Asia, and North America. In the United
States, every year since 2000, an average of 72,400 wildfires
burned an average of 7.0 million acres annually (Congressional
Research Service, 2019). The prevalence of wildfire disasters can
disrupt the functioning of society and cause calamitous impacts
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on the economy and human well-being. The 2018 Camp Fire,
the deadliest and most destructive wildfire in California history,
burned an area of 153,336 acres, destroyed 18,804 structures,
caused economic losses of $16.5 billion, and killed more than
85 civilians (BBC, 2018).
During natural disasters, voluntary funding from NGOs, private sectors, and individual donors is a vital resource for communities to recover from disasters (Toyasaki & Wakolbinger, 2014).
Charitable giving is often the quickest response to sudden disaster crises and provides timely resource assistance for survivors
to rebuild their homes and for communities to strengthen resilience (Wei et al., 2019). Acknowledged as major service providers
during a disaster, NGOs help to develop a sustainable community by delivering timely assistance to disaster victims and building networks with government, media, and other stakeholders
(Nikkhah & Redzuan, 2010).
The fundraising capacity is essential for organizations to maintain sustainable developments and perform social responsibilities,
which further makes the society fully functioning. However, charity fundraising has become much more competitive in the United
States, given the increased number of charity organizations.
According to the National Center for Charitable Statistics (2019),
more than 1.5 million NGOs were registered in the United States.
The growing number of NGOs in the United States has increased
the competition for government funding (Castaneda et al., 2008).
Individual donors comprise a significant portion of NGO funding.
According to a report by the National Philanthropic Trust (2019),
the number of individual donor-advised fund accounts at National
Charities has increased from 129.34k in 2014 to 593.36k in 2018
in the United States. Therefore, attracting private donations could
be a useful approach for NGOs to mobilize resources.
To mobilize resources in times of disasters, it is essential to
understand how to design effective messages that persuade people to engage in prosocial behaviors. Specifically, the current study
aims to examine the persuasiveness of two framing strategies (i.e.,
gain- vs. loss-framing and first- vs. third-person imagery perspective) in promoting people’s donation intentions, grounded in the
context of the 2018 Camp Fire.
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Literature Review
First- vs. Third-Person Imagery Perspective
Persuasive messages can ask recipients to visualize an event from
different perspectives. In a first-person imagery perspective, individuals visualize the scene from an internal actor’s perspective,
imagining that they will experience the consequences themselves.
In a third-person imagery perspective, individuals visualize the
scene from an external observer’s perspective, imagining other
people will suffer the consequences (Ostinelli & Bockenholt, 2009;
Vasquez & Buehler, 2007).
Scholars that have been interested in examining the effect of
imagery perspectives on persuasion have based their research on
the construal level theory. Construal Level Theory (CLT) proposes
that people use higher levels of construal (i.e., abstract mental representations) to represent an object as the psychological distance
from an object increases (Trope & Liberman, 2010). When thinking of distant targets (e.g., others), people often perceive a larger
psychological distance than thinking of proximal targets (e.g.,
self). Based on CLT, a third-person imagery perspective imposes
more psychological distance than a first-person imagery perspective; therefore, will induce a more abstract mental representation
when individuals imagine the scenario; conversely, a first-person
imagery perspective will trigger a more concrete mental representation (Vasquez & Buehler, 2007).
The perspectives that people take can influence their mental representations (Ruby & Decety, 2004), attitude (Vorauer &
Sasaki, 2014), and behavior change (Rennie et al., 2014a). For
example, Libby et al. (2005) found that imagining performing
an activity from a third-person perspective produced less vivid
mental reports than imagining an activity from a first-person perspective. Through two experiments, Rennie et al. (2014a) found
that a first-person imagery perspective was more effective than a
third-person imagery perspective in persuading people to donate
blood and quit smoking. Rennie et al. (2014a) argued that visualizing engaging in a behavior from a first-person imagery perspective produced a more concrete image than a third-person imagery
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perspective, which will enhance their motivation to perform this
behavior. Although it seems that first-person imagery perspectives are more efficacious than third-person imagery perspectives
in persuasive settings, it is unclear why perspectives have different impacts. Furthermore, scholars argue that the communication
scholarship has been focused on how media represent suffering
yet often fails to explain how to engage the public and connect the
publics with distant others (Seu & Orgad, 2017). To fill these gaps,
the first objective of this study is to examine how imagery perspectives influence individuals’ donation intentions and to explore the
underlying psychological process.
Imagery Perspectives on Perceived Relevance
Perspectives can influence individuals’ perceived relevance of
the situation (Hoever et al., 2012). Messages framed with a firstperson imagery perspective seem to increase recipients’ perceived
relevance compared to messages with a third-person imagery perspective (Libby et al., 2011). For example, Marx and Stapel (2006)
found that people who were asked to think about a stereotyped
target from a first-person imagery perspective perceived the situation as more self-relevant and reported more threat than those
who were asked to think from a third-person imagery perspective. According to the construal level theory, proximal situations
are more likely to be perceived as being closer or more relevant
to oneself (Trope & Liberman, 2010). With a first-person imagery
perspective, people think as if they are the ones who are experiencing the event, and they perceive a smaller social distance compared to when thinking from a third-person imagery perspective.
Therefore, they will feel more proximal to the situation, have more
vivid mental representations, and perceive the situation as more
self-relevant. Hence, we hypothesize that:
H1: Individuals who are exposed to a first-person imagery perspective message will report higher perceived relevance of wildfire
than those who are exposed to a third-person imagery perspective
message.
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Imagery Perspectives on Empathy
Empathy refers to “the capacity to understand and respond to
the unique affective experiences of another person” (Lamm et al.,
2007, p. 42). Previous studies found that first- and third-person
imagery perspectives produce different levels of empathy. When
prior studies have used a first-person imagery perspective, individuals have been asked to imagine themselves in another’s place
and to think about how they, themselves, would feel; this perspective was believed to trigger more empathy than a third-person
imagery perspective message that asked individuals to think as
an observer (Vorauer & Sasaki, 2014). For example, Batson et al.
(1997) found that people who were asked to imagine how they
would feel in another person’s situation reported experiencing
more empathetic emotions compared to people who were asked
to remain objective. Similarly, Lamm et al. (2007) found when
watching video clips of patients, people who were instructed to
take a first-person imagery perspective (i.e., imagine themselves
to be in the patients’ situations) reported higher empathetic concern than those who were instructed to imagine the feelings of the
patient. When thinking from a first-person imagery perspective,
individuals may experience feelings of relevance with message
characters and feel as though they are living the experience that is
being shared, which further increases empathy (Chen et al., 2017).
Therefore, we hypothesized that:
H2: Individuals who are exposed to a first-person imagery perspective message will report higher induced empathy than those who are
exposed to a third-person imagery perspective message.

Imagery Perspectives on Donation Intention
Previous studies have found that messages framed with a firstperson imagery perspective can be more persuasive than a
third-person imagery perspective. For example, Ostinelli and
Bockenholt (2009) found that in advertising settings, a firstperson imagery perspective message is more persuasive than a
third-person imagery perspective message when marketers want
to sell an experience (e.g., snowboarding). In another study about
promoting healthy eating, Rennie et al. (2014b) found that health
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messages that asked individuals to visualize engaging in fruit
consumption from a first-person imagery perspective were more
likely to engage in healthy eating compared to those who were
asked to take a third-person imagery perspective. Although many
studies have examined the influence of imagery perspectives on
people’s risk perceptions and judgments (e.g., Libby et al., 2011),
scant research is available on how first- vs. third-person imagery
perspectives influence individuals’ intention to engage in prosocial behaviors.
We argue that messages with first-person imagery perspectives
are more effective than messages with third-person imagery perspectives in persuading people to donate. When imagining from
a first-person perspective, individuals are more likely to perceive
the wildfire issue as self-relevant, which increases their identification with the victims and further triggers empathy (Chen et
al., 2017). First-person imagery perspective can increase people’s
empathetic concern, which is an important predictor of altruism
motivation and helping behavior (Lamm et al., 2007). Similarly,
Decety and Yoder (2016) found that people who exhibited more
cognitive empathy were more sensitive to injustice for others and
more likely to perform moral behaviors. Hence, we hypothesized:
H3: Individuals who are exposed to a first-person imagery perspective message will report higher donation intention than those who
are exposed to a third-person perspective imagery message.
H4: Perceived relevance and empathy mediate the influence of perspectives (first- vs. third-person imagery perspective) on donation
intention.

Gain vs. Loss Framing
Prospect theory suggests that people react to messages differently depending on how these messages are framed (Detweiler
et al., 1999). Grounded in prospect theory, gain vs. loss message
framing has been widely applied in persuasive communication to
show the influence of message features on persuasive outcomes
(e.g., O’Keefe & Nan, 2012). By definition, a gain-framed message
emphasizes the desirable outcomes associated with compliance
with the advocated behavior (e.g., “If you exercise regularly, you
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will reduce your chance of developing heart disease”), while a lossframed message highlights the undesirable consequences of not
performing the advocated behavior (e.g., “If you don’t exercise
regularly, you will increase your chance of developing heart disease”) (O’Keefe & Jensen, 2008).
Relative Persuasiveness of Gain- vs. Loss-Frame
Despite having numerous studies examine the persuasive effect
of gain vs. loss message framing, there has been no unanimous
conclusion on which framing is more persuasive (O’Keefe &
Nan, 2012). Instead, the relative persuasiveness of gain- vs. lossframing largely depends on the advocated behavior (O’Keefe &
Jensen, 2007; O’Keefe & Jensen, 2008) and other message features
(Lu, 2016). For example, previous meta-analysis studies found
that gain-framed messaging is more persuasive than loss-framed
messaging in promoting disease prevention behavior (O’Keefe &
Jensen, 2007), whereas loss-framed messaging is more persuasive than gain-framed messaging in promoting disease detection
behavior (O’Keefe & Jensen, 2008). When it comes to the relative persuasiveness of framing depending on message features,
Lu (2016) found that gain framing is more effective than loss
framing when a sadness appeal accompanies it; conversely, loss
framing would be more persuasive than gain framing when it is
juxtaposed with a hope appeal. Although several moderators have
been identified by previous studies, empirical evidence regarding
the relative persuasiveness of gain- versus loss-framed messages
is still ambiguous (Nan, 2007), especially in a donation context.
Therefore, more studies are needed to explore the boundary conditions of the persuasiveness of gain vs. loss message framing.
The Moderation Role of Gain- vs. Loss-Framing
According to the construal level theory, as social distance increases,
information will be represented in more abstract terms (i.e., highlevel construal); whereas when social distance decreases, information will be represented in more concrete terms (i.e., low-level
construal) (Nan, 2007; Trope & Liberman, 2010). Nan proposed
an integrated perspective combining construal level theory and
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gain vs. loss framing, suggesting that a gain-framed message is
associated with a higher construal level than a loss-framed message, and therefore a gain-framed message would be more persuasive when judgments are made for others than for oneself. Based
on construal level theory, we argue that when a message is framed
with a first-person imagery perspective, judgments will be made
on socially proximal entities (e.g., selves), and information will
be represented in low-level construal. Therefore, a loss-framed
message should be more effective. Conversely, when a message is
framed with a third-person imagery perspective, judgments will
be made on socially distant entities (e.g., others), and information will be represented in high-level construal. Therefore, a gainframed message should be more persuasive.
Moreover, empirical studies found that the relative persuasiveness of gain vs. loss framing varies based on individuals’ perceived
relevance of the message (e.g., Wirtz et al., 2015). For example,
Wirtz et al. found that when the message was considered personally relevant, a loss-framed message is more effective in persuading individuals to reduce alcohol drinking than the gain-framed
message. Similarly, Bosone and Martinez (2017) found that a lossframed message is more persuasive than a gain-framed message
when promoting detection behaviors, but only when individuals
perceive the issue as highly personally relevant. Therefore, we
argue that when individuals are exposed to first-person imagery
perspective messages, they will process this issue as experiencing
it, perceive the issue as self-relevant, and therefore they will be
more likely to be persuaded by loss-framed messages. In contrast,
when individuals are exposed to third-person imagery perspective messages, they will process this issue as observing it; therefore,
they will be less likely to perceive self-relevance and more likely to
be influenced by gain-framed messages. Hence, we propose:
H5: The effect of perspectives (first- vs. third-person imagery
perspective) on donation intention is more pronounced in a lossframed condition than a gain-framed condition.
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Conceptual Model

Methods
Procedures
A 2 (first-person imagery perspective vs. third-person imagery perspective) × 2 (gain frame vs. loss frame) between-subject
online experiment was conducted via Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk) crowdsourcing service in July 2019. The participants
were informed that they would read a screenshot of a Facebook
post from the American Red Cross.
Participants were randomly assigned to read one of four Facebook messages. In the first-person imagery perspective condition,
the post asked participants to imagine that they were the victims
of the wildfire disaster (i.e., “Not just in California, but wildfires
are a common problem for Americans—More than 100,000 wildfires clear 4 million to 5 million acres of land in the U.S. every
year. Imagine the wildfire happened in your community, what if
one day you could face financial, emotional uncertainty due to the
wildfires?”). In the third-person imagery perspective condition, the
post asked participants to imagine the situations of victims who
were experiencing the wildfire disaster (i.e., “A series of large wildfires erupted across the country including California—More than
100,000 wildfires clear 4 million to 5 million acres of land in the
U.S. every year. An innumerable people lost their homes in the fire.
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Countless people have faced financial, emotional uncertainty due
to the wildfires.”). In the gain frame condition, the post informed
participants that victims could rebuild their homes if donations
were received (i.e., “With receiving support from the Wildfire
Relief Fund, thousands of people affected by wildfire-related disasters could rebuild homes, get medical treatments, and save their
lives. You can make a difference by clicking here!”). In the loss
frame condition, the post informed participants that victims might
lose their chance to rebuild homes if donations were not received
(i.e., “Without receiving support from the Wildfire Relief Fund,
thousands of people would lose their chance to rebuild homes, fail
to receive medical treatments, and might lose their lives. You can
make a difference by clicking here!”).
In total, 25.9% of the participants were assigned to the “I-gain”
condition, 23.6% were assigned to the “they-gain” condition,
25.1% were assigned to the “I-lose” condition, and 25.5% were
assigned to the “they-lose” condition. After being exposed to the
Facebook message, participants completed posttest questions that
addressed perceived relevance, empathy, donation intention, and
demographic information.
Participants
There were 549 participants recruited for the online experiment, and each was compensated $1.00 for completing the study.
Responses that did not pass attention checks or that contained
missing values were filtered out before data analysis. In total, there
were 475 valid responses for data analysis. The final dataset of participants consists of 51.8% (n = 246) males and 45.9% (n = 218)
females. Among the participants, 31.8% (n = 151) were 18–29
years old, 39.6% (n = 188) were 30–39 years old, 13.9% (n = 66)
were 40–49 years old, 10.1% (n = 48) were 50–64 years old, and
2.3% (n = 11) were 65 years old or over (unreported age: 2.3%). Of
the sample, about 56% (n = 261) reported having attained some
or higher level of a bachelor’s degree. About 7.8% (n = 37) of participants reported annual household incomes of $9,999 or below,
15.6% (n = 74) between $10,000 and $24,999, 30.1% (n = 143)
between $25,000 and $49,999, 21.5% (n = 102) between $50,000
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and $74,999, 14.3% (n = 68) between $75,000 and $99,999, and
6.8% (n = 32) of $100,000 or above (unreported annual household
income: 1.9%).
Measurement
Perceived relevance (RE). Perceived relevance was indicated by
three items measured on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree;
7 = strongly agree) that asked participants to respond to the following statements: “Thinking back to the Facebook post about
donation from American Red Cross, I think the message is relevant to my life,” “The message grabbed my attention,” and “The
message said something important to me” (M = 4.49, SD = 1.55,
Cronbach’s α =.85).
Empathy (EM). A three-item version of the basic empathy
scale (Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006) measured empathy, including “I
got caught up in the victims’ feelings,” “I felt sad when I imagined
the victims’ feelings,” and “I can understand how the victims feel”
based on a 7-point scale (1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree)
(M = 4.59, SD = 1.51, Cronbach’s α =.83).
Donation intention (DI). Three items were employed to operationalize donation intention: (1) I would try to make a wildfire
donation; (2) I intend to participate in wildfire donation; (3) I plan
to participate in wildfire donation. Participants answered the items
based on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (very
likely) (M = 4.05, SD =1.95, Cronbach’s α =.96).
Analysis Plan
A multigroup Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was conducted
using R package lavaan (Rosseel, 2012). Multigroup SEM analysis
examined whether values of model parameters vary across different groups and is often applied in models with a categorical moderator (Kline, 2015). We took two steps in the analysis. First, we
established the measurement model and examined the measurement invariance across the gain- and loss-framed groups. Second,
we examined path coefficients invariance across the gain- and lossframed groups and fitted the final structural model. Parameters
and fit indices were estimated based on the maximum-likelihood
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method. Indirect effects were estimated with bootstrapping procedures (bootstrap = 1,000).

Results
Model Fitting: A Multigroup SEM Model
The Measurement Model
First, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to assess
whether the measurement model demonstrates an acceptable
fit to the data. The measurement model was specified to capture
three latent factors (i.e., perceived relevance, empathy, and donation intention) with their associated indicators. All latent variables
were allowed to covary freely with each other. To scale the metric
of each latent factor, we set one loading of each factor as 1. Results
found that the initial measurement model had an adequate fit (CFI
= 0.98, SRMR = 0.04, RMSEA = 0.08) based on the cutoff criteria
recommended by Kenny (2015). Therefore, we accept the initial
measurement model as the final measurement model.
Examining Measurement Invariance
Second, we examined measurement invariance between the
gain-framed group and the loss-framed group. Measurement
invariance assesses the “psychometric equivalence of a construct
across groups or across time” (Putnick & Bornstein, 2016, p. 1).
Invariance of measurement would suggest that any differences
between the gain-framed group and the loss-framed group stem
from structural differences in path coefficients rather than measurement differences. Four measurement models were specified
and tested (see Table 1). Model 1 was the baseline model, which
was constructed without constraints. Model 2 constrained the factor loadings equal across groups. In model 3, factor loadings and
item intercepts were modeled invariant. Model 4 constrained factor loadings, item intercepts, and means on latent variables equal
across the gain- and loss-framed groups. The chi-square differences
were not significant between model 2 and model 1 (Δc2 [6] = 9.58,
p = .14), between model 3 and model 2 (Δc2 [6] = 4.86, p = .14),
and between model 4 and model 3 (Δc2 [3] = 3.86, p = .28). These
findings suggest that the gain-framed group and the loss-framed

41

“I Lose” “I Gain” vs. “They Lose” “They Gain”

TABLE 1 Testing for Measurement Invariance Across Gain- and LossFramed Groups
Measurement Model

χ2

df

Δχ2

Δdf

P

Model 1: Baseline model
(no equality constraints
imposed)

150.98

48

Model 2: Factor loadings
modeled invariant

160.56

54

9.58

6

0.14

Model 3: Factor loadings
and item intercepts
modeled invariant

165.41

60

4.86

6

0.56

Model 4: Factor loadings,
item intercepts and latent
means modeled invariant

169.27

63

3.86

3

0.28

group had no significant differences in factor loadings, item intercepts, and group means on the latent variables. In other words, the
two groups are invariant in terms of measurement.
The Structural Model
Next, we examined whether the structural model differs across the
gain- and loss-framed groups. A series of SEM multigroup analyses were performed. First, we established a fully restricted model,
in which all hypothesized structural paths were constrained equal
across the two groups. Second, we established an unconstrained
model in which all path coefficients were freely estimated. Both the
fully restricted model (CFI = 0.98, SRMR = 0.05, RMSEA = 0.07,
and c2/df = 2.27) and the unconstrained model (CFI = 0.98, SRMR
= 0.03, RMSEA = 0.07, and c2/df = 2.27) yielded excellent model
fit. The two models yielded a significant chi-square difference (Δc2
[6] = 13.45, p <.05), suggesting that the gain-framed group and
the loss-framed group differ significantly in the structural model.
To further identify the source of path inequality, we compared
the fully restricted model with a set of less restricted models. In
each less restricted model, one path coefficient was released from
the constraint (i.e., freely estimated). A significant chi-square difference was found between model 1 (i.e., the fully restricted model)
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and model 2 (Δc2 [1] = 7.22, p <.01), suggesting that releasing the
path from imagery perspectives to perceived relevance from the
equality constraint significantly improved the model fit. In other
words, the impact of imagery perspectives on perceived relevance
differed significantly between the loss-framed group and the gainframed group. Similarly, the path from perceived relevance to
empathy was found to differ significantly between the gain-framed
group and the loss-framed group (Δc2 [1] = 4.00, p <.05). Conversely, the paths from imagery perspectives to empathy (Δc2 [1] =
0.04, p = 0.83) and to donation intention (Δc2 [1] = 0.66, p = 0.42),
and the paths from perceived relevance (Δc2 [1] = 0.53, p = 0.47)
and empathy (Δc2 [1] = 0.29, p = 0.59) to donation intention were
found to have no significant difference between the gain-framed
group and the loss-framed group. Results were summarized in
Table 2.
TABLE 2 Testing for Path Coefficients Invariance Across Gain- and LossFramed Groups

Structural Model

Equality
of Path
Coefficients

χ2

df

Δχ2

Δdf

Model 1: Baseline model
(fully restricted model)

140.55

62

–

–

Model 2: Path IM → RE
unconstrainted

133.33

61

7.22**

1

unequal

Model 3: Path IM → EM
unconstrainted

140.51

61

0.04

1

equal

Model 4: Path RE → EM
unconstrainted

136.55

61

4.00*

1

unequal

Model 5: Path RE → DI
unconstrainted

140.02

61

0.53

1

equal

Model 6: Path EM → DI
unconstrainted

140.26

61

0.29

1

equal

Model 7: Path IM → DI
unconstrainted

139.89

61

0.66

1

equal

Note: * significant at 0.05 level, ** significant at 0.01 level. IM = Imagery perspectives,
RE = Perceived relevance, EM = Empathy, DI = Donation intention.
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FIGURE 2 The Multigroup Structural Model with Path Coefficients
Notes: * significant at 0.05 level, *** significant at 0.001 level. Non-significant paths are in
dotted line. c2 = 129.14, df = 60 (c2 /df = 2.15), CFI = 0.98, SRMR = 0.03, RMSEA = 0.07. Imagery
perspectives (0 = third-person perspective, 1 = first-person perspective).

Finally, based on the results of invariance in path coefficients,
we established a final structural model, in which the path from
imagery perspective to perceived relevance and the path from perceived relevance to empathy were freely estimated, and all other
hypothesized structural paths were constrained equal across the
gain- and loss-framed groups. The final model yielded an excellent
model fit (CFI = 0.98, SRMR = 0.03, RMSEA = 0.07, and c2/df =
2.15). Figure 2 presents the final structural model with unstandardized path coefficients.
Hypothesis Testing
Effects of Imagery Perspectives on Perceived Relevance and
Empathy
First, we explored whether individuals who were exposed to a
first-person imagery perspective message reported higher perceived relevance (H1) and induced empathy (H2) than those who
were exposed to a third-person imagery perspective message.
Results from the multigroup SEM analysis suggested that the
effects of imagery perspectives differed across the gain- and lossframed groups.
There was no significant difference between the firstperson imagery perspective group (“I gain”) and the third-person
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perspective imagery group (“they gain”) in individuals’ perceived
relevance when the message was gain-framed (bIM-RE = -0.27, p =
.13). However, when the message was loss-framed, participants
who were exposed to a first-person imagery perspective (“I lose”)
message reported higher perceived relevance than those who were
exposed to a third-person imagery perspective (“they lose”) message (bIM-RE = 0.48, p <.05). Therefore, H1 was partially supported.
When the message was gain-framed, imagery perspectives had
no significant direct (bIM-EM = 0.12, p = .33) or indirect effect (bIM= -0.30, p = .13, 95% CI = [-0.67, 0.08]) on empathy. However,
RE-EM
when the message was loss-framed, imagery perspectives yielded a
significant indirect effect on empathy through perceived relevance
(bIM-RE-EM = 0.40, p < .05, 95% CI = [0.04, 0.75]), suggesting that
individuals who were exposed to the first-person imagery perspective (“I lose”) message reported significantly higher empathy than
those who were exposed to the third-person imagery perspective
(“they lose”) message. Therefore, H2 was partially accepted.
Effects of Imagery Perspectives on Donation Intention
Next, we examined the effects of imagery perspectives on donation intention and probed the underlying mechanism. Specifically,
we proposed that a first-person (vs. a third-person) imagery perspective message had a positive effect on individuals’ donation
intention (H3), which was mediated from perceived relevance and
empathy (H4).
Results found that imagery perspectives had no significant
direct effect on donation intention (bIM-DI = -0.08, p =.51), regardless of whether the message was gain-framed or loss-framed.
Three indirect paths from imagery perspectives on donation
intention were examined. First, we examined the mediating role of
perceived relevance. Results found that the indirect effect of firstperson (vs. third-person) imagery perspective on donation intention through perceived relevance was significant when the message
was loss-framed (bIM-RE-DI = 0.30, p < .05, 95% CI = [0.02, 0.57])
but not significant when the message was gain-framed (bIM-RE-DI =
-0.17, p = .14, 95% CI = [-0.40, 0.06]). Second, we examined the
mediating role of empathy. Results found that empathy was not a
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significant mediator for both the gain-framed group and the lossframed group (bIM-EM-DI = 0.05, p = .33, 95% CI = [-0.05, 0.16]).
Third, we examined whether perceived relevance and empathy
sequentially mediate the effects of imagery perspectives on donation intention. Results found that the indirect effect through perceived relevance and empathy was significant for the loss-framed
group (bIM-RE-EM-DI = 0.18, p < .05, 95% CI = [0.01, 0.35]) but not
for the gain-framed group (bIM-RE-EM-DI = -0.13, p = .14, 95% CI =
[-0.31, 0.05]). These results suggested that the positive effect of the
first-person imagery perspective on donation intention was significant when the message was loss-framed (“I lose”). The effect of
imagery perspectives was operated through perceived relevance,
which increased individuals’ donation directly as well as indirectly
through empathy. Therefore, H3 and H4 were partially supported.
The Moderating Role of Gain- vs. Loss-Framing
Finally, we examined whether the advantage of a first-person (vs.
third-person) imagery perspective message was more pronounced
when the message was loss-framed compared to gain-framed
(H5). To detect whether the overall effect of imagery perspectives
on donation intention differs significantly across gain- and lossframed groups, we computed the group difference in the total
effects and the corresponding bias-corrected (BCdiff) bootstrap
confidence intervals. The bootstrapping method has been widely
applied for comparing group differences of total effects in multigroup SEM analysis (Ryu & Cheong, 2017). Results found that the
overall effect of imagery perspectives on donation intention in the
loss-framed group was 0.77 (p < .05, BCdiff 95% CI = [0.01, 0.35])
significantly higher than that of the gain-framed group, suggesting that the persuasiveness of a first-person imagery perspective
message was more pronounced in a loss-framed message than a
gain-framed message. Therefore, H5 was supported.
Table 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics of individuals’ donation intention under the four experimental conditions.
ANOVA analysis provided additional support for the interaction
relationship between imagery perspectives and gain- vs. lossframing (F (1, 446) = 6.01, p < .05, ηp2 = .013). Specifically, when

123
112
119
121

Gain × Third person (“They gain”)

Loss × First person (“I lose”)

Loss × Third person (“They lose”)

N

Gain × First person (“I gain”)
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4.31

4.73

4.58

4.33

Mean

0.14

0.14
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0.14

SE
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4.43
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4.58

4.49

Mean
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TABLE 3 Descriptive Statistics of Manipulation Groups on Dependent Variables

3.70
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4.03
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0.15

0.15

0.16

0.15

SE

Donation
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the message was loss-framed, a first-person perspective (M =
4.12, SE =.15) was more persuasive than a third-person perspective message (M = 3.70, SE =.15, p <.05). Additionally, when the
message was framed with a third-person imagery perspective,
the gain-framed message (M = 4.03, SE =.16) was more persuasive than the loss-framed message (M = 3.70, SE =.15, p <.05) in
enhancing individuals’ donation intentions.

Discussion
Charitable giving is an important resource that helps individuals and communities to recover from disasters. This study set out
to understand the role of message framing on people’s donation
intentions in the wake of a natural disaster. Grounded in the context of the 2018 California wildfire, we examined the relative persuasiveness of two message features (i.e., gain- vs. loss-frames and
first- vs. third-person imagery perspectives).
As expected, when a message is loss-framed, a first-person
imagery perspective (“I lose”) message is more effective in enhancing individuals’ perceived relevance, inducing empathy, and
increasing their intention to donate compared to a third-person
perspective message (“They lose”). Notably, the influence of the
first-person imagery perspective on individuals’ donation intentions was operated through perceived relevance, which increased
donation intention directly as well as indirectly through enhancing empathy. These results suggested that for loss-framed messages, when exposed to the first-person imagery perspective (“I
lose”), individuals are more likely to perceive the wildfire issue as
self-relevant, experience feelings of empathy, and thus more likely
to donate compared to being exposed to the third-person imagery
perspective (“They lose”).
However, when the message was gain-framed, we did not find
any difference between first- vs. third-person imagery perspective
messages (i.e., “I gain” vs. “They gain”) in individuals’ reaction to
the message and their donation intentions. This might be because
people are more influenced by negativity bias when judgments are
made for socially proximal entities (e.g., selves) than socially distant
entities (e.g., others). Perspectives from evolutionary psychology
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may also help explain the findings. When negative emotions are
aroused from messages, a person’s self-protection system is activated (Griskevicius et al., 2009). We argue that when encountering
a loss-framed message, individuals will be primed into selfprotection thinking and will be more influenced by egoistic motivation. Therefore, an “I lose” message will be more persuasive than
a “they lose” message in promoting donation intention.
Moreover, we found that the relative influence of gain- vs.
loss-frames depends on the imagery perspectives of the message.
When a message was framed with a third-person imagery perspective, the gain-framed (“they gain”) message more effectively
persuaded people to donate than the loss-framed (“they lose”)
message. This finding can be explained with the construal level
theory. Vasquez and Buehler (2007) posited that a third-person
imagery perspective would induce a higher construal level than
a first-person imagery perspective. Nan (2007) proposed that a
gain frame is associated with a higher construal level than a loss
frame. As Nan argued, when the persuasive message is framed
with a third-person imagery perspective, a gain-framed message
can match it by inducing a high level of construal; therefore, it will
be more persuasive than a loss-framed message that induces a low
level of construal. However, when the message is framed with the
first-person imagery perspective, there is no significant difference
between gain frame (“I gain”) and loss frame (“I lose”). One possible reason is that when a message is considered self-relevant, even
low-level construal will become salient (Nan, 2007). Therefore, the
loss-framed message and the gain-framed message will not differ
significantly in their persuasiveness when a first-person imagery
perspective was presented.
Theoretical Implications
This study yielded several theoretical implications. First, this study
highlights the role of imagery perspectives as a message framing technique in persuasion. The actor-observer effect has long
been considered as one barrier to individuals’ prosocial behaviors
(Fabes et al., 1989). According to the actor-observer effect, actors
often attribute their own behavior to situational causes, whereas
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observers attribute the behavior of others to person-based causes
(i.e., selfishness) (Robins et al., 1996). However, the findings of this
study show the possibility of overcoming such limitations. Our
data revealed that framing messages with a first-person imagery
perspective can effectively enhance perceived relevance, induce
empathy, and promote helping behaviors for others. A first-person
imagery perspective, which asks individuals to think as an internal
actor rather than an external observer, may help people to understand others’ feelings and therefore increase their willingness to
help. In this study, we examined the role of imagery perspectives
(i.e., first- vs. third-person imagery perspectives) in a donation
context. Future studies can continue to examine the role of imagery perspectives in other contexts such as prejudice reduction.
Second, this study contributes to gain-loss framing literature
by testing the relative persuasiveness of gain-loss frames. Drawing upon construal level theory, we argued that when a message is
framed with a third-person imagery perspective, individuals will
use a high construal level. Therefore, a gain frame, which arouses
a high construal level, will be more persuasive than a loss frame.
Future studies can replicate our design in other contexts to see
whether imagery perspectives consistently moderate the relative
persuasiveness of gain-loss frames. We also encourage future studies to explore how message framing influences the construal level
of mental representations.
Practical Implications
In addition to theoretical contributions, this study’s practical contributions should also be acknowledged. First, our data empirically
revealed that framing charity appeals with a first-person imagery
perspective and a loss-frame can more effectively enhance individuals’ donation intentions. Our results suggest that communication
strategies (i.e., gain-or-loss framing and imagery perspectives in
the current study) inspire corporates and nongovernmental organizations to design messages more effectively for resource mobilization, such as fundraising and achieving their communication
goal. To promote prosocial behavior in fundraising campaigns,
organizations can ask message recipients to put themselves in
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others’ shoes and to imagine they are experiencing the disaster.
Second, emotional appeal through empathy is an effective strategy in persuading people to donate. In order to promote altruism motivation, fundraising practitioners could involve emotional
components in the message.
Limitations
There are limitations to this study. First, we used a single message as stimuli, which limits the generalizability of the findings to
different messages. Second, we did not assess participants’ actual
donation behaviors. Although behavioral intention is a strong predictor of behavior (Feldman & Lynch, 1988), it is unclear whether
the effects detected in this study would apply similarly to actual
behavioral outcomes. Third, we only assessed the immediate
effects of messages. Future studies could examine whether message
framing has a delayed or long-term effect on individuals’ donation
intention. Fourth, this study employed convenient samples from
MTurk. Although the obtained data quality from MTurk samples
is generally decent (Chandler et al., 2019), concerns remain about
diversity among MTurk workers. Our findings should be cautiously interpreted when generalizing to the general population.
Moreover, this study is grounded in a U.S.-centric context. Studies
have found that culture could impact the publics’ charitable giving
intentions (Siemens et al., 2020); therefore, we recommend future
research to replicate our studies in other cultural contexts.
Concluding Remarks
The current study contributes to an understanding of how imagery
perspectives (i.e., first- vs. third-person imagery perspective) and
loss-gain framing influence individuals’ donation intentions in the
wake of a wildfire disaster. Findings in this study can shed light on
message designs for future fundraising activities.
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